First.-

Empire.-

Port Stanley.-

Bombing Raid in 1944.-

The Hawk T2 Test Pilots.-

British lightning.-

British operational military pilots have begun flying what is being touted as the world's most advanced stealth fighter jet, the F-35. But even as they take to the skies, Defence Secretary Philip Hammond has given the clearest indication yet that the UK may not now buy all the jets it had planned.

Speaking exclusively to Sky News, Mr Hammond pledged that the first 48 aircraft on order at a cost of around £100m each would be bought to service the new Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers from 2020. But he would not commit to a further 90 planes, which had originally been proposed. He said: "It's dependent on politics, money and the state of the world, but it's also dependent on what is not yet clearly known, what the mix between manned fighter jets and unmanned aircraft is going to be."

Mr Hammond said there were two trains of thought, one suggesting an 80/20 split of manned to unmanned aircraft in future, the other suggesting the exact opposite. He said the final decision would determine how many manned F-35s the UK could buy.

The Defence Secretary interrupted a visit to Washington to meet his recently appointed US counterpart Chuck Hagel and fly to the Naval Air Station at Patuxent River in Maryland where the F-35, or the Lightning II as it will be known in Britain, is being tested. Mr Hammond looked on as former Harrier pilot Pete "Wizzer" Wilson, who now works for defence contractor BAE Systems, which is part of the project team for the F-35, demonstrated the 'B' variant of the aircraft, which is capable of a short take-off and vertical landing.



In Florida at Eglin Air Force Base in the northwest of the state, the first UK military operational pilots began flying the F-35B just six weeks ago. There are only two of them - Lt Commander Ian "Tidders" Tidball from the Royal Navy and Squadron Leader Frankie Buchler from the RAF. Both have vast experience on other types of fast jets - Lt Cdr Tidball on Sea Harriers and F-18s, Sqn Ldr Bulcher on the Jaguar and latterly Typhoon aircraft.

After frustrating delays due to problems with the test aircraft and then the weather, both British pilots are now qualified to fly the F-35. Lt Cdr Tidball told after his qualifying flight: "Having come back from the Harrier and F-18, the aircraft handles absolutely exceptionally, very responsive even in these bumpy conditions."

Sqn Ldr Buchler is also a fan of the new jet, parts of which are still classified and Sky News was not allowed to film. He said: "It's awesome, a boyhood dream. I've always wanted to fly the best fast jets in the world and here we are with a fantastic platform and I'm lucky enough to be one of the first guys from the UK flying it. It's better than working for a living."

The British pilots fly two of the three UK jets so far delivered. But it will be another five years before the first squadron, based at RAF Marham, is set up on UK soil. In the meantime, 17 Squadron will be the first UK unit to fly the F-35B out of Edwards Air Force base in California from next year.

The F-35 programme comprises three variants in all. The A model is the "base" model and will be flown predominantly by the US Air Force, the B variant, which the UK is buying, will also be flown by the US Marine Corps, while the C or carrier variant, is adapted with "cat and trap" equipment to fly on and off American aircraft carriers.

The bulk of the projected orders will come from the US - close to 2,500 planes - with the UK originally due to buy 138 in total and the other "partner" nations, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, Australia, Denmark and Norway, due to buy about 500 between them.

The projections from Lockheed Martin, the lead contractor, suggest that including sales to other "coalition" countries there will be 3,922 F-35s sold during its planned 30-year production run. That's good news for the UK economy too, because 15% by value of each sale comes to these shores, largely through the contribution of BAE Systems in Lancashire, where much of the tail of every F-35 is manufactured.

The biggest danger to the programme at the moment is the immense cost, estimated at £2.5bn so far, given that defence budgets across the world, particularly in the West, are being slashed.

Gatos a ras.-

RAF Akrotiri.-

Tocando diana.

Recruitment Video.-

This video was primarily used for RAF recruitment in the 1980s, and follows IX Squadron as they go through the process of receiving a tasking, briefing, planning and then executing a full interdiction mission, including aerial refuelling and being bounced by "hostile" fighters, in the form of the USAF F-5E Aggressor Squadron that was based in the UK at the time.

If the Cold War had turned hot, this is the kind of operation the RAF would have been called upon to perform, flying low and fast to deliver nuclear weapons or runway denial ordnance.

Los otros Tornados.-

Durante el Red Flag de 1997, los Tornado F.3 de la RAF se presentaron en Nevada con el entonces novísimo enlace de datos JTIDS basado en los protocolos del Link 16. Anonadados, las tripulaciones allí presentes observamos cómo una y otra vez los británicos vapuleaban sin piedad a los siempre tan cacareados F-15 de la USAF, cuyos pilotos observaban, desconcertados, cómo sus Eagles iban desapareciendo del juego sin saber claramente qué o quién los estaba golpeando.

Controlados por uno de sus AWACS, los Tornado realizaban penetraciones pasivas a cotas altas y medias y disparaban sus misiles con los radares en frío, aunque bastante conscientes de lo que sucedía a su alrededor gracias a la información obtenida mediante el enlace de datos.

Cuando meses después los F-15 corrieron una suerte parecida, aunque ahora frente a varios F-16AM belgas equipados con sistemas IDM, los pilotos de Eagle decidieron que no volvían a subir hasta que les montasen algún cacharro de esos, o en caso contrario que el MoD se hiciése cargo del pago de las cervezas porque ellos ya no llegaban.

Los Tornado británicos disponían además de un novedoso "sistema stealth" cuyo mando en cabina presentamos de forma EXCLUSIVA para todos los miembros del Club.

English Electric..... Lightning!!!.-

Dambusters debated.-

Was the legendary and courageous 1943 RAF Dambusters Raid a ‘strategic success or a conjuring trick’? PAUL STODDART from the Royal Aeronautical Society Air Power Group provides a report on an academic debate on the effectiveness of Operation CHASTISE.


Seventy years have elapsed since 617 Squadron led by Wing Commander Guy Gibson breached the Mohne and Eder dams in western Germany on the night of 16-17May 1943. Despite the passage of time, the release of previously classified information and the intensive study by historians, opinion remains divided as to the effectiveness of the operation. To commemorate what remains one of the most, if not the most famous single air power action, on 4 April the Cranwell branch of the RAeS devoted its annual Trenchard Lecture to a debate on Operation Chastise.

The three speakers were the distinguished historians and authors Professor Eric Grove, Dr Peter Caddick-Adams and James Holland. The debate was hosted by the Royal Air Force College Cranwell and took place in the splendid setting of College Hall Officers’ Mess with an audience of around 80. Cranwell is a few minutes flying time south of RAF Scampton from which 617 Squadron flew on the Dams Raid.

The Admiralty and the RAF carried out extensive tests at sites around the country. These revealed that the drum-shaped bomb (codenamed 'Upkeep') needed to be dropped from a height of 60 feet (18m), and at a ground speed of 232mph.

The bomb would spin backwards across the surface of the water before reaching the dam. Its residual spin would then drive the bomb down the wall of the dam before exploding at its base.

All that was needed now was men to fly specially modified Lancaster bombers which would carry the 'Upkeep'.

Divided Opinions.-

The official history: “…the most precise bombing attack ever delivered and a feat of arms which has never been excelled”. “…the effects of this brilliant achievement upon the German war machine were not, in themselves, of fundamental importance nor even seriously damaging”.

“The truth about the Dams Raid is that it was a conjuring trick, virtually devoid of military significance…The story of the raid is one of sloppy planning, narrow-minded enthusiasm and misdirected courage”.

The most widely read account of the RAF’s contribution to the strategic air offensive against Nazi Germany is probably Max Hastings’ ‘Bomber Command’. Of the 425 pages, barely a page is actually assigned to the Dams Raid and Hastings sums up the operation as follows: “The Ministry of Economic Warfare in London correctly judged that the Mohne and the Sorpe dams were central to the Ruhr water supplies. But after destroying the Mohne, 617 Squadron used their remaining mines to wreck theEder dam, which was quite irrelevant. Bomber Command had merely judged it more easily breachable…than the Sorpe”.

“Operation CHASTISE achieved considerably more than it has been given credit for, particularly by latter-day historians. The Dambusters Raid was a legendary feat and a remarkable strategic success; its undoubted accomplishments do not deserve to be belittled unjustly”.

The ever quotable Sir Arthur ‘Bomber’ Harris offered this assessment of the Upkeep mine: “It was…designed…outside the…Air Ministry; it [was] almost a rule that such weapons were successful, while those produced by the official organisation were too often failures”.

Map showing the route of the raid.

The Debate – Opening Statements – Opening Salvoes.-

Dr Peter Caddick-Adams.

The debate opened with each speaker offering an initial statement on the operation’s aims and effectiveness. Dr Caddick-Adams began by asking the rhetorical question as to how success should be defined so that the operation could be objectively assessed. He emphasised that much of the general understanding of the raid is based on the media’s 1943 presentation of the results, i.e. a less than impartial view. In early 1943, though the Allies had defeated the Axis in North Africa, the Eastern Front was still undecided. American forces were building up in the UK representing a growing challenge Britain’s leadership role in the West. It was therefore understandable that the headlines were very positive and the accounts offered an exaggerated assessment of the results achieved. Dr Caddick-Adams emphasised that the raid should not be considered in isolation but in the context of Bomber Command’s Battle of the Ruhr. That campaign ran from March to July 1943and involved 43 raids and around 18,000 sorties in which 872 aircraft were lost. That was a rate of 4.8% i.e. above the usually accepted limit of 4%; when damaged aircraft were included the casualty rate was 11%. The aim of the five month campaign was to neutralise the German war economy yet arms manufacturing was already widely dispersed. The London based Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) questioned the focus on the Ruhr pointing out that, for example, the region contained only one aircraft factory. In short, the Ruhr while important was not the sole target worthy of attention.

James Holland.

James Holland opened by referring to the book on the raid that preceded his own. John Sweetman’s ‘The Dambusters Raid’ was originally (sub) titled ‘Epic or Myth’, a comment on the stark contrast between the various schools of thought. He noted that using Google image search for Guy Gibson produced as many photos of the actor Richard Todd who portrayed him in the film. Similarly, the film is often the entirety of people’s knowledge of the operation. The film portrays a hard pressed wartime Britain that still has real clout and the nation can be proud of the achievement. It also presents Barnes Wallis (through Michael Redgrave’s portrayal) as a detached academic rather than the very effective networker Wallis actually was. Another misrepresentation is that of Wallis single-handedly promoting his dams attack scheme in the face of reactionary opposition from the Air Ministry. He was a friend of Group Captain Winterbottom who worked in RAF Intelligence and who was extremely well connected with influential officials. Additionally, the Air Ministry had, in 1937, identified the importance of the Ruhr dams but had also noted the difficulty of breaching them. To some extent Wallis was pushing on an unlocked door and the scepticism he faced from certain quarters was not unjustified given the challenge of using Upkeep successfully. For example, the commander-in chief of Bomber Command, Air Chief Marshal Harris had taken over a year to build up the force for his area bombing campaign. He viewed low level attacks (as required for Upkeep) as being unacceptably dangerous and with insufficient prospects of achieving the significant results claimed by the ‘panacea merchants’ promoting them. Harris objected to the conversion of up to 30 Lancasters for Upkeep and advocated to the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), Sir Charles Portal, against this. To his credit, when Portal authorised Operation Chastise, Harris did all he could to ensure its success.

Professor Eric Grove.

Professor Grove emphasised that the aim was to inflict decisive damage on the ‘white coal’ of the Ruhr; the dams provided hydro-electric power, water for steel making (each ton of steel required eight tons of water) and drinking water for a very densely populated region. The British had studied the region and the MEW had correctly identified the central importance of the Mohne and the Sorpe dams to the Ruhr. The Upkeep mine was specifically designed to attack masonry built gravity dams such as the Mohne while the Sorpe was of earth buttress design and so was far less vulnerable. Nevertheless, Wallis believed that several Upkeeps dropped on the crest of the Sorpe; the aim being to crack the concrete core causing leakage and eventual breaching or forcing the reservoir to be drained to enable repair. Relatively little effort was expanded in determining how best to attack the Sorpe and in the course of planning, the operation developed to exploit the weapon rather than to achieve the overall aim, i.e. to disrupt theRuhr’s industry. Thus the raid focus was the Mohne and theEderdams with the Sorpe as an afterthought. (It should be noted that while the Eder was a gravity dam and so vulnerable to Upkeep, it was not in the Ruhr valley. It held back the then largest reservoir in Europe). Had the Mohne and Sorpe been breached, the resulting effects would have been much greater.

Of the five aircraft allocated to the Sorpe, only one reached the target; it bombed accurately damaging the dam crest. The main force of nine aircraft expended five mines on the Mohne and the remaining four on the Eder. Of the reserve wave of five aircraft, three were directed to the Sorpe and two to less important dams in the Ruhr Valley. Of the Sorpe ‘three’, one never reached the target, one hit the dam causing further damage and the third could not locate the Sorpe in the thickening mists of the early morning. Of the other two aircraft, one was lost and one attacked the Bever Dam (instead of the intended target, the Ennepe Dam) but caused no damage.

The Möhne dam in Germany's Ruhr valley secured the water supply for much of the surrounding area. Water from its reservoir was also used to generate electricity.

Professor Grove stressed that he was not denigrating the value of the operation though the loss of eight aircraft from nineteen (42% and 53of 56 crew killed) was very heavy. If applying the crude measure of people killed, the raid might be deemed effective. Sixty eight people were killed per aircraft committed and 162 per aircraft lost; the figure for a conventional raid on Dortmund was one tenth of the latter measure. In the still controversial February 1945 attack on Dresden, 37 people were killed per aircraft committed.

Operation Chastise did not knock out the Ruhr but it was a significant addition to Bomber Command’s most productive campaign. Professor Grove agreed with the conclusion of a recent, notable history of Germany’s wartime economy specifically that the Ruhr campaign was a great success and “stopped Albert Speer’s expansion plan in its tracks”. During June and July 1943, the Ruhr’s output fell. Harris had been right; the Dams Raid did not achieve all that had been hoped (and claimed) for it but it was still effective. It was also very good for British prestige in Washington (and Moscow) “eating the 8^th Air Force’s sandwiches” by showing that the RAF could also achieve precision bombing as well as conducting area bombing.

Professor Grove summed up his introduction by likening Operation Chastise to the Battle of Trafalgar. The significance of Trafalgar could be argued on the grounds that the war against Napoleonic France continued for a further ten years. Yet Trafalgar was “an important outward sign of inward grace” in that it demonstrated the Royal Navy’s capability and professionalism. Likewise, the Dams Raid did so for the RAF.

The Wider Debate.-

James Holland pointed out that prior to the operation, there were differences in opinion as to what it was likely to achieve – even among the supporters. In fact, Wallis was one of the few (perhaps the only person) who believed that breaching the dams would result in cataclysmic effects that would substantially shorten the war. He was convinced that cutting off the power to the Ruhr would cause production to practically cease. However, others had less ambitious expectations for Upkeep’s capability and hence the raid was planned around the weapon. That is, its suitability for gravity dams was an important factor notwithstanding the importance of the Sorpe Dam.

The debriefing of Wing Commander Guy Gibson's crew at Scampton after the raid. Of the 133 aircrew that took part, 53 men were killed and three became prisoners of war. On the ground, almost 1,300 people were killed in the resulting flooding.

The operation was actually more successful than some commentators have claimed even though it was achieved less than the 1955 film implied. (The Hardest Victory: Eleven factories were destroyed and 114 damaged. 2822 hectares farmland were ruined with 6316 farm animals killed. Twenty five road bridges were destroyed, with ten damaged. Various power stations, pumping stations, water and gas facilities were put out of action with serious disruption to water, electricity and gas supplies). To some extent, the criticism of the last 30 years or so has been a reaction to the original overstatements. The rebuilding of the Mohne and Eder was achieved remarkably rapidly (around five months – building the Mohne took five years) and the fact that considerable effort was devoted to this is proof of Chastise’s success. Although there was no immediate water shortage in the Ruhr, it was necessary to rebuild the dams quickly in order to collect the winter rains and so provide water in 1944. The dams were also iconic structures for the German population; examples of Teutonic achievement. Breaching them was an affront that demanded a prompt response. Rebuilding diverted considerable effort from other projects (48 hours after the raid, 7000 workers were heading for clear-up and rebuilding work in the Mohne valley, the Eder valley,Dortmund and Kassell. Another 20,000 were also assigned to various repair tasks with many diverted from the building of the Atlantic Wall). James Holland concluded by emphasising that all wartime commanders and planners seek major damage from relatively small effort; despite 617’s losses, the Dams Raid was one of the rare cases to actually achieve this.

Peter Caddick-Adams offered three points. Firstly, he referred to one of the principles from Sun Tsu’s ‘The Art of War’ – to avoid costly attritional conflict but instead ‘fight smart’ and strike your opponent so as to cause major loss at comparatively low cost. In this respect, Operation Chastise was successful. Admittedly the headlines and newsreels of the day included some wishful thinking and certainly the Third Reich was not in danger of collapse owing to the damage caused. However, Britain was engaged in a titanic contest and the maintenance of national morale was extremely important so making some overstatement understandable in the circumstances.

Secondly, the raid must be seen in the wider context of WW2 as a whole and 1943 in particular. In early 1943, the Allied leaders met at the Casablanca Conference to decide their strategy for defeating the Axis powers. There was much debate as to how best to engage Nazi Germany with the Americans advocating a landing in France during 1943. Churchill believed that to be excessively risky and he succeeded in postponing the invasion to the following year. However, this option depended on the expansion of the strategic bombing offensive and an increase in its effectiveness. The UK-US relationship was that of an ad hoc coalition; the two nations had common interests but there was also competition between them. The American view was that the RAF’s area bombing policy was less effective than the 8^th Air Force’s daylight campaign. Chastise was an example of British ingenuity (to both the US and the Soviet Union) and of the ability to achieve precision and significant effect in a night attack.

Thirdly, it is worthwhile examining the Dams Raid from the perspective of effects-based operations (EBO) and Clausewitz’s theory of the centre of gravity (CoG), i.e. an indispensable capability. The principles of EBO include seeking actions likely to achieve significant, beneficial results. While that may seem obvious, military history offers many examples where actions were taken because they were could be taken rather than because they were the best option. An adversary’s CoG is the essential component of their ability to fight. Wallis believed that power generation was the CoG of Germany’s war making capacity and that breaching the dams would neutralise it – a war winning result. This was an unrealistic view given the resilience of the German economy but it is also a slur to describe the raid as a ‘conjuring trick’ – the operation caused significant damage.

From 9.28pm on 16 May, 133 aircrew in 19 Lancasters took off in three waves to bomb the dams.
Gibson was flying in the first wave and his aircraft was first to attack the Möhne at 12.28am, but five aircraft had to drop their bombs before it was breached.
The remaining aircraft still to drop their bombs then attacked the Eder, which finally collapsed at 1.52am. Meanwhile, aircraft from the two other waves bombed the Sorpe but it remained intact.

Following the general consensus between the speakers there was than a difference in views between James Holland and Professor Grove. The former proposed that some ‘mission creep’ occurred with the RAF going beyond the initial aim of damaging the German war economy. Effects beyond the economic were considered worthwhile hence the focus on the Eder Dam after the Mohne was breached. Destroying two iconic structures had very significant psychological effect. The gravity design Eder Dam was not only vulnerable to Upkeep but it also held the largest reservoir in Germany. Professor Grove strongly disagreed. He emphasised that the whole logic of the raid was to inflict industrial damage and to maximise that it was essential to breach both the Mohne and the Sorpe. (See the section: The background to operation Chastise) As this was not achieved, the operation could be judged to have failed on the basis of its original aims. However, he expressed his respect for the achievement of the crews and noted that the raid was cost effective in terms of the results despite the heavy losses. It achieved a great deal but suffered from being developed in great haste (James Holland concurred) and subsequently achieved both less than what was intended and what might actually have been possible.

Dr Caddick-Adams noted the importance of raising the morale of both the British population but also that of Bomber Command which, at that time, was fighting the Battle of the Ruhr. Operation Chastise achieved these aims. It was timely as the Command had just completed a series of thirteen attacks on the U-Boat pens on the French Atlantic coast; many aircraft were lost and not one pen was destroyed. (Professor Grove interjected here pointing out that the RAF waited until these massive structures had been completed before attacking them).

James Holland agreed with the value of maintaining the morale of the hard pressed bomber crews. The achievement of spectacular results was important and that was a factor in selecting targets on the basis of weapon suitability and hence likely effectiveness. In short, selecting the Eder made sense. The Ministry of Economic Warfare was correct in identifying the importance of the Sorpe but it was focused on the industrial level and not the wider issues such as morale and national influence. (Note: 27 Mar 43: A Chief of the Air Staff memo to Combined Chiefs of Staff stressed the value of “The economic and moral” effects).

The last point was taken up by Dr Caddick-Adams. On 19 May 1943, Churchill addressed a joint session Congress in Washington. The dramatic results of the operation strengthened both his credibility and that of Britain as a whole. Within the American political and military establishments, there were strong proponents of defeating Japan before Germany. Churchill’s advocacy of the ‘Germany first’ option gained considerable force from Chastise’s success; the raid illustrated British determination and capability. Professor Grove agreed on the value of the resulting political capital but noted that the operation was not planned for such a reason.

*Photos By Imperial War Museum of London.

At her Majesty's service (One).-

Photo By Paul A. Barrow.

Aircrew members of 771 Naval Air Squadron walk from their Sea King helicopter following an exercise.


Photo By Martin Carney.

A Royal Navy Merlin helicopter overflies a Royal Marine Landing craft during an Olympic security exercise near Weymouth, Dorset.



Photo By Ray Jones.

Merlin helicopters from 814 Naval Air Squadron are pictured onboard HMS Illustrious during Exercise Joint Warrior near Scotland. 814 Naval Air Squadron – better known throughout the Navy as the Flying Tigers (hence their striking badge) – flies from ships and air bases around the world shielding the Fleet from submarines. They also take it in turns with their sister squadron 820 to support the international effort against illegal activities on the high seas east of Suez – that’s piracy, people-trafficking, smuggling, drug-running and terrorism. 

Photo By Caroline Davies.

A Royal Navy helicopter pilot with the Fleet Air Arm prays for good weather prior to a flypast for the Queen's Diamond Jubilee celebrations in London.

Photo By Dave Jenkins.

A line of Royal Navy Hawk trainer jets are pictured at RNAS Yeovilton sporting the livery of the 100th Anniversay of flying in the Royal Navy.

Photo By Mez Merrill.

A Royal Marine from the Commando Helicopter Force Mobile Air Operations Team (MAOT) directs Sea King Mk4 helos into a helicopter landing site (HLS) during Exercise Scottish Lion.

Photo By Stewart Paterson.

A Royal Air Force Typhoon jet is refuelled at RAF Northolt in Middlesex at the start of Exercise Olympic Guardian.

Photo By Pete Mobbs.

A Royal Air Force Tornado GR4 prepares for takeoff from Gioia Del Colle airbase in Italy during Operation Ellamy, the UN backed operation to secure the skies over Libya in 2011. The Tornado GR4 is a variable geometry, two-seat, day or night, all-weather attack aircraft capable of delivering a wide variety of weapons. Powered by two Rolls-Royce RB 199 Mk 103 turbofan engines, the GR4 is capable of low-level supersonic flight and can sustain a high subsonic cruise speed. The aircraft can fly automatically at low level using Terrain Following Radar (TFR) when poor weather prevents visual flight.

The aircraft is also equipped with Forward Looking InfraRed (FLIR) and is Night Vision Goggle (NVG) compatible. This gives it a relatively unique all weather night capability as well as making it an impressive platform for mounting passive night electro-optical operations.

For navigation purposes, the Tornado is equipped with an integrated Global Positioning Inertial Navigation System (GPINS). The GR4 also has a Ground Mapping Radar (GMR) to identify fix-points and update navigation systems as well as providing an air to air search facility.

The GR4 is also equipped with a Laser Ranger and Marked Target Seeker (LRMTS) that can be used to locate targets designated on the ground or can provide accurate range information to ground targets.

Photo By Russ Nolan.

A paratrooper waits for the signal to jump from a Hercules aircraft. Soldiers from 16 Air Assault Brigade are training to maintain their role as the British Army's Rapid Reaction Force.

More than 1600 troops were taking part in Exercise Joint Warrior in southwest Scotland. The training is a key step in maintaining the skills necessary for the Airborne Task Force (ABTF) role, which sees the Colchester-based 16 Air Assault Brigade ready to deploy anywhere in the world at five days notice. The exercise scenario saw the area of West Freugh airfield representing part of an area disputed by two fictional nations named Pastonia and Dragonia, which were divided by economic and ethnic factors.

The scenario represented complex challenges for the international community requiring NATO to send a rapid intervention force to the area to create the conditions for a United Nations peacekeeping force to take control. The UK's ABTF used a combination of parachute, air assault, and tactical air landings to rapidly insert the troops into the disputed area.

Once inserted the ABTF, based around the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 5th Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland (5 SCOTS) Battle Group, continued to defend the airfield. The Battle Group also developed the airfield into a base from which several air assault operations could be launched to defeat the enemy force, create stable conditions for the population, and potentially evacuate UK civilians.

Photo By Ray Jones.

Flight deck crews onboard HMS Illustrious battle a snowstorm to clear the deck of snow and ice. HMS Illustrious was operating off the coast of Norway taking part in Exercise Cold Response. The ship was supposed to be embarking Royal Marines this afternoon from K Company, 42 Commando, but the weather took a turn for the worse. Driving snow brought the flight deck to a standstill and all flying operations were postponed until further notice.

The flight deck crews and aircraft maintainers had to battle high winds and blizzard conditions to secure the aircraft to the deck before retreating inside for a well earned cup of tea.

Photo By Simmo Simpson.

A Kuwaiti F18 Hornet fighter aircraft stages an attack on Royal Navy Type 23 frigate HMS St Albans as a member of the ships protection force, trains a mini gun on the fast moving target during an exercise in the Middle East.

As HMS ST Albans made passage en route to Kuwait, the ship took part in a Passex (Passage Exercise) with Kuwaiti forces. The ship came under attack from Kuwaiti F18 Hornet jets prior to providing a Kuwaiti Supe Puma helicopter a platform to practice winching drills.

HMS St Albans was deployed to the Middle East for 6 months carrying out Counter Terrorism, Anti Narcotics and Anti Piracy operations before returning to the UK in December 2011.

Photo By Russ Nolan.

Captain Harry Wales prepares his Apache helicopter prior to a training mission in the USA.

Exercise Crimson Eagle is the final conversion training for Army Air Corps Apache pilots, the first part takes place in Naval Air Facility (NAF) El Centro, California, before moving to Gila Bend in Arizona for the live firing phase. The terrain for the exercise is very similar to that of Afghanistan, making it extremely realistic and demanding for the pilots.

Photo By Dave Blackburn.

A Royal Air Force GR4 Tornado aircraft awaits permission to take off from Kandahar Airfield during Operation Moshtarak in Afghanistan. Tornado GR4 aircraft from 904 Expeditionary Air Wing, based at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan played a vital role in the ISAF Operation MOSHTARAK. The aircraft are provided close air support for ISAF troops on the ground and imagery to aid battle commanders and identify possible Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).

Photo By Dave Sterratt.

Trainee Royal Navy aircrew are pictured during a lecture onboard RFA Argus. Their detachment to the ship was the final hurdle before earning their wings as pilots, observers and aircrewmen in the Fleet Air Arm.

Photo By Phil Major.

A Royal Air Force aircrewman sits in the back of a Puma helicopter during Exercise Askari Thunder over Northern Kenya.

Since the Royal Air Force Puma Force completed its role on operations in Iraq in the Summer of 2009, it has been providing dedicated aviation support to British Army training on Exercise ASKARI THUNDER in northern Kenya. Exercise ASKARI THUNDER is a major stepping stone for the Army’s pre-deployment training for Afghanistan. Aviation support to this exercise is provided by the Joint Helicopter Force (Kenya) (JHF(K)), which comprises a joint command structure, primarily operating RAF Puma helicopters.

The home base for JHF(K) is elevated some 6200ft above mean sea level at the Kenyan Air Force’s Laikipia Air Base. With a generally hot and dry climate that includes two rainy seasons, conditions are testing. The Exercise area covers a range of environments from the dense Jungle of Kathendini to the relatively high mountains which surround the extensive plains of the Great Rift Valley. Conditions in the areas of the plains and mountains are very similar to those found in Afghanistan.

The extensive Kenyan-managed live-firing range at Archers Post provides a realistic backdrop for integrated tactical and live-fire preparatory training; a five-hour drive from the basic medical facilities at NSG (Nanyuki Show Ground) and a further four hours from Nairobi. Soldiers deploy for a minimum of two weeks to Archers Post and throughout this time it is inevitable that there will be a requirement for medical treatment due to the nature of the environment in which they are training. The availability of JHF(K) support is therefore critical to enabling the arduous live-fire training to take place with the comfort of a rapid casualty transfer from the point of wounding to the most suitable medical facility.

Photo By Pete Devine.

A Royal Air Force Typhoon pilot climbs into the cockpit at the end of Operation Ellamy in 2011. The last 4 Royal Air Force FGR4 Typhoons left the Italian '36 Stormo' air base at Gioia del Colle in Southern Italy after completing a successful deployment.

The Typhoons of 3(F)Squadron were deployed on Operation Ellamy as part of the UK contribution to NATO's Operation Unified Protector which enforces UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which aims to protect Libyan civilians from the Qadhafi regime.

The Typhoons formed part of 906 Expeditionary Air Wing (906 EAW). IX personnel saw off the jets from the pan at Gioia del Colle; 3(F) Squadron personnel left theatre earlier in the morning.

Photo By Andy Benson.

Members of II Squadron RAF Regiment and the US Marine Corps board a US Osprey aircraft at Camp Bastion, Afghanistan. The Coalition troops deployed on Operation Backfoot, a combined operation to disrupt insurgent activity in Helmand province.

A Joint UK/US/Afghan operation south of Bastion Airfield involving 2 Squadron, RAF Regiment, has found and destroyed a large cache of Taliban IED-making equipment which was ready to be used in attacks against Afghan and ISAF forces.

Operation Dishata Pasha (Pashtu for Backfoot) was launched at dawn on Monday (Feb 6), with RAF Regiment troops under command of Sqn Ldr Jules Weekes (33), Officer Commanding 2 Sqn, RAF Regiment. The force also included warriors from Afghan Army’s 3rd Brigade and US Marines from 2 Marine Expeditionary Force.

The force deployed by US Osprey aircraft, with its unique tilt-rotor capability, and the operation resulted in the find and destruction of a suspected insurgent IED cache close to Bastion Airfield in Helmand Province. The force also scooped a wealth of intelligence despite coming under fire several times.

The operation took place in the Dasht (or desert) south of Bastion Airfield, whose protection is the task of 2 Squadron, operating as part of 3 RAF Force Protection Wing. The Dasht is a sparse landscape of rolling fields and scrub dotted with compounds and is increasingly being used as a harbour area by Taliban forces who have come under pressure elsewhere by successful coalition operations.

Photo By Mez Merrill.

The pilot and co-pilot at the controls of a Royal Navy Seaking Mk4 helicopter whilst on operations over Helmand Province, Afghanistan. Royal Navy Sea King Mk4 helicopters from 845 and 846 Naval Air Squadrons normally based with Commando Helicopter Force at the Royal Naval Air Station Yeovilton in Somerset, flying as part of the Joint Helicopter Force Afghanistan in support of current operations in Afghanistan.

Photo By RayJones.

An Army Air Corps Apache helicopter is pictured being lifted from the hangar to the deck onboard the Royal Navy aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious. Two Apache helicopters from 664 Squadron, Army Air Corps embarked for a two week training package, to enable pilots and ground crews to acclimatise to working in a maritime environment. They were joined by a Chinook from 7 Squadron, Royal Air Force which flew out to the ship for a few hours deck landing practice.

Photo By Mark Dixon.

A Royal Air Force Hawk pilot from 208 Squadron walks away from his aircraft to a post sortie debrief at RAF Valley in Anglesey, Wales.

From myth to legend.-

A TV crew doing a show on the weapons and vehicles of war in Afghanistan, happen to be aboard an RAF Chinook helicopter when it is called out to evacuate some US and Afghan Army casualties from a firefight.

The aircraft comes under fire during the evacuation, and a round goes through the windshield, wounding pilot Flight Lieutenant Ian "Chomper" Fortune in the face. He maintains his composure and completes his mission by returning the damaged aircraft, crew and casualties safely back to base.

The pilot, 28, from the RAF's 27 Squadron, received the Distinguished Flying Cross for "an act of valour, courage whilst flying in active operations". Flt Lt Fortune, of Kingston, Surrey, said to his crew: "Chaps, I think I've been hit - but I'm OK."

In addition, the legend of the Bravo November Continues to Grow.

Eye in the sky.-

The Airborne Stand-off Radar (ASTOR) is a new British capability for operations over and around the battlefield. It is to form the UK equivalent to the US E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS).  ASTOR is to provide a long-range all-weather theatre surveillance and target acquisition system capable of detecting moving, fixed and static targets. It is designed to meet a joint Army and RAF requirement. The production contract was signed by Raytheon Systems in December 1999 for the supply of five air-platforms, eight ground stations, and contractor logistic support. The principal elements of ASTOR are the Bombardier Global Express aircraft, to be know as Sentinel R1 in RAF service, and the Raytheon ASARS-2 side looking airborne radar used on the U-2.

The radar operates at high altitude and in all weathers to provide high resolution. ASARS-2 has been reported to provide images of the battlefield at ranges of 160 km, at altitudes up to 47,000 feet. High speed data links transfer the data from aircraft to ground stations in near real time. The system has directional and broadcast data links which are interoperable with existing US U-2Rs, JSTARS and command and control networks. The first aircraft were received by No 5 (AC) Squadron in early 2007. The MoD has spent £954m on five aircraft plus eight ground stations to be operated by 5 (Army Co-operation) Squadron, based at RAF Waddington in Lincolnshire.

Sentinel R1 - ASTOR Specifications:


-Crew
2 RAF Pilots. 1 RAF Mission Commander. 2 Image Analysts (either RAF or Army Intelligence Corps).
-Length

 30.3m

-Wingspan

 28.6m

-Height

 7.57m

-Empty Weight

 22,817kg

-Max Take-Off Weight

 43,094kg

-Range

 6,500nm/12,000km

-Endurance

 14+ hours

-Operating altitude

 15,000m

-Engines

 2 x RR BR710

-Systems

 ASARS-2 radar derivative

 Narrowband datalink subsystem (NDLS), wideband data link based on Common Data Link (CDL)

-Defensive Aids Subsystem (DASS)

 Developed for the Nimrod MRA4, including missile warning system, radar warning receiver, towed radar decoy and chaff and flare dispensers

Sentinel System.-

After the 1990 Gulf War, it was identified by the allies that Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance had played a key role in the success of this operation. In particular, the use of Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) had proved invaluable in the tracking and prosecution of enemy ground forces. This galvanised the UK to acquire its own capability and in 1993 the requirement was endorsed by the MOD.

The solution chosen by the MOD was the Airborne STand-Off Radar (ASTOR) to be known as the Sentinel system. The Sentinel system consists of Air, Land and Support segments. The Air segment consists of 5 converted Bombardier Global Express aircraft, named the Sentinel R1, fitted with a Dual Mode Radar (DMR). This radar is similar to the U2 ASARS radar, and collects SAR imagery and GMTI data. The Land segment consists of 2 transportable Operational Level Ground Stations (OLGS) and 6 mobile Tactical Ground Stations (TGS). These ground stations (GS) are connected to the aircraft via data links and provide Near Real Time (NRT) intelligence to commanders and their staffs at multiple levels of command.

5(Army Co-operation) Sqn operates the Sentinel system and is based at RAF Waddington. It is a joint sqn, commanded by an RAF Wing Commander. With over 150 RAF and 100 Army service personnel, 5(AC) Sqn is the largest flying sqn in the RAF. The aircraft are manned by two RAF Pilots and a Mission Commander, whilst the intelligence gathered by the aircraft is analysed by 2 on-board Image Analysts (IAs) for NRT effect. The on-board IAs are a mix of RAF and British Army Intelligence Corps SNCOs. The GS provide a longer term analytical capability to answer more in-depth questions and Requests for Information (RFIs). The GS are staffed by IAs from the Intelligence Corps and RAF, and supported by R Signals and REME technicians, both at RAF Waddington and the deployed operating base.

Sentinel was originally intended for conventional war-fighting operations, to track armoured formations and conduct strategic reconnaissance tasks. However, the capability has been shown to be flexible and has been adapted for use in a number of different roles by 5(Army Cooperation) Sqn. The Sentinel’s value has been proven in support of counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan, and in 2011 the capability provided vital Intelligence to enable coalition air assets to protect civilians from pro-Gaddafi Forces under UN Security Council Resolution 1973. Sentinel is deployed on an enduring basis, providing International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with operational and tactical intelligence which is having a tangible effect on the success of coalition operations in Afghanistan.

As part of the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) of 2010 it was announced that the SAR and GMTI capability Sentinel provides would be retained by the UK until the UK’s involvement in Op HERRICK had ceased. 5(AC) Sqn will continue to operate the Sentinel system until a suitable platform has been developed onto which this valuable capability can be transferred. Until that point, 5(AC) Sqn and Sentinel will remain at the forefront of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) for the RAF in support of operations in Afghanistan.

Reprieve for axed Sentinel R1 spy plane
23 November 2011.-

The decision to scrap the Sentinel spy plane under defence cuts is to be reviewed.

Head of the RAF Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton says the Sentinel R1 - fitted with sophisticated radar imaging equipment - played a "pivotal" role in spotting and identifying Colonel Gaddafi's forces and should be retained.


Under the Strategic Defence and Security Review, all five of the RAF's Sentinel aircraft have been listed for withdrawal from service by 2015. However, Air Chief Marshal Dalton has indicated it could be in line for a reprieve in the light of the aircraft's performance in Libya. In an interview with BBC Radio 4's The World At One he said: "Whenever we have had an operation we then have to go back and have a look at whether the assumptions we made before or during were correct.


"The value of Sentinel and the value of the picture it provided was so critical that I think we will need to have another look and see what way we can provide that capability in the future."


The aircraft had been particularly important in convincing the politicians that international forces were able to identify accurately and hit targets on the ground, he said.


"Sentinel was pivotal to be able to provide the picture - the picture in electronic terms, the picture in imagery terms - so that our intelligence was well-placed therefore to identify those targets and to precisely target against them," he said.


"It was also important because we were able to demonstrate that to lawyers, to the targeteers, to the politicians, that we could see what was going on, we could identify them moving as well as the static, and we could therefore focus on what was important to achieve the overall effect."

Parliament Home Page.
Session 2010-12/HC 950 Operations in Libya.
Written evidence from Raytheon UK.-


Raytheon UK is pleased to submit this written evidence in support of the Defence Committee’s inquiry into Operations in Libya. In particular this evidence is submitted with respect to the question posed about the implications of this operation for the outcomes of the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR).


Background


The Airborne Standoff Radar (ASTOR) program that includes the Sentinel R Mk1 as the aircraft element was launched in December 1999 as a key component of the Armed Forces Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capability to become the country’s future key ground surveillance capability. It provides surveillance over a wide area; the ability to focus on a discreet area of interest; and the ability to identify moving targets. Using a business jet enables the sensor to be flown much higher than larger aircraft thus greatly extending the range of radar coverage.


Raytheon delivered the programme to the original target cost of £850 million and went from concept to operational capability, deployed in theatre in just over eight years, a significant achievement for what was an extremely complex and technically ambitious programme.
The Strategic Defence and Security Review announced the retirement of the RAF’s fleet of five Sentinel R Mk 1 aircraft on completion of the support to ongoing operations in Afghanistan circa April 2015.


Support to Operation Ellamy


The Sentinel R Mk1 has been providing strategic ISTAR support to the UK and NATO since the beginning of operations in Libya. It has achieved a greater than 97% level of availability. The Sentinel capability has been critical in delivering data to support the general intelligence picture and also to identify specific targets for the strike force. The platform has been at times the only strategic ISTAR platform available and hence has been pivotal to the execution of tasking in support of the objectives of the coalition. The performance of both the platform and the support provided by Raytheon to the operations has been formally acknowledged and praised by the front line command.
The Sentinel R Mk1 has proven its critical role in support of both Operation Ellamy and Operation Herrick providing a wide area surveillance capability that currently can only be delivered by a few assets. It has been relied upon by the collation forces on a number of occasions, and is one of the few capabilities that the UK can deploy that can demonstrably add immediate value to the operation.

SDSR Capability Gaps

The Strategic Defence and Security Review announced the retirement of the RAF’s fleet of five Sentinel R Mk 1 aircraft on completion of the support to ongoing operations in Afghanistan circa April 2015. This decision leaves the UK without a viable wide area ground surveillance capability. Raytheon’s understanding is that the MoD believes that wide area surveillance can be provided by a combination of the Scavenger capability, the procurement of which has not yet commenced, and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

However, whilst these programmes may provide a ground surveillance capability, they are intended to provide coverage complementary to Sentinel’s wide area capability. JSF and Scavenger will be optimised for local area surveillance provided by smaller sensors and less powerful processing capability. Unmanned assets like Scavenger need cueing from very wide area pattern of life based product libraries and without Sentinel, another means will be needed to update these databases in near real time. We are not aware of MoD plans to provide this capability.

With the JSF not due to enter into service until between 2017 and 2020 and Scavenger not planned to deliver an operational capability until sometime after 2018, there remains a risk of no capability in this area for a significant period of time.

The Sentinel system also has a valuable role in communications. The Ground Station currently provides the coalition forces with the only means of interoperation with JSTARS which will be lost when Sentinel is retired.

Furthermore this loss will have an effect on potential plans for the long range deployment of UAVs, for which radio relay of data may be required, especially if SATCOM bandwidth is limited or not available. Sentinel’s high altitude ceiling has been utilised in this way by the USAF using the original ASTOR demonstrator GEX 9001 as a trials aircraft operating out of Afghanistan.

The Battle Against IEDs

In addition to its pattern of life picture that Sentinel currently provides, the system could assist further in the battle against IEDs due to the inherent quality of the raw data provided. Offboard post processing trials have proven that there is the capability to identify disturbed earth and cue the identification of IED locations. The Sentinel aircraft does not require any modifications in order to deliver this near real-time IED detection capability. Therefore, with minimal additional outlay, further trials could be undertaken with in theatre data to refine this capability, and potentially help to reduce the casualty figures in theatre.

Such a capability is considered essential given the latest trend in warfighting scenarios, and would be valuable, not just for current operations in Afghanistan, but wherever the next theatre of interest lies. Afghanistan has proven that terrorism will likely continue to revolve around insurgency and IED based threats, a scenario that the current platforms have difficulty in addressing over wide areas.

Future Potential

The ASTOR System has untapped capability that with incremental investment could deliver significantly enhanced capabilities. This spiral capability development would be a more cost effective and lower risk way of delivering new capability, rather than investing in the development and entry into service of new platforms.

The SDSR decision to cancel the Nimrod MRA4 leaves the UK with maritime capability gaps that the Sentinel R Mk 1 capability could address, including:

·Deep sea search and rescue maritime target detection;

·Scene of Action presence for maritime emergencies beyond the range of current Sea King helicopters;

·Overhead naval force protection; and

·Wide area submarine threat detection.

The Sentinel Dual Mode Radar Sensor (DMRS) could be modified to accept a high sea state target detection capability that would match and possibly even surpass that lost by the cancellation of the Nimrod MRA4. This capability is already in service in the US.

In addition the ASTOR Ground Station could be upgraded, with relatively little investment, to provide a multi ISTAR hub for the reception of information feeds from Watchkeeper, Reaper and, in the future, Scavenger. This would fit well into the future plans for the Solomon programme, as we understand them, maximising reuse of existing assets, saving valuable resource and costs.

Conclusion

Sentinel R Mk 1 has proven invaluable to operational success in Libya and Afghanistan.

The SDSR decision to retire Sentinel leaves the UK with capability gaps covering significant wide area pattern of life surveillance, long range target detection and coalition force interoperability.

Retirement of Sentinel leaves the UK with vital capability gaps some of which may be filled by new platforms in the 2020 -2024 timeframe, but not all.

In addition spiral development of the proven Sentinel capability could deliver solutions to capability gaps left by other SDSR decisions, such as maritime search and rescue, and deep sea threat detection, at significantly lower cost and risk, than developing and deploying new platforms.

RAF Advanced Fast Jet Training.-

Low Level Anti-Ship Mission.-

12th Squadron participation in NATO Training Exercise Opengate back when they were equipped with the Blackburn Buccaneer. The part of the enemy ship is played by HMS Kent of the Royal Navy.

Piratas del Mediterráneo.-

La RAF en los 60.-

¡Hombre, a lo mejor algunos diálogos sí están un poco preparados!, pero el video vale la pena, palabrita.